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There has long been a need for additional legislation to clear the
highways of the menace of intoxicated drivers. The necessary con-
victions to deter effectively the large number of citizens who do drive
after taking "a few" have not been forthcoming under present legis-
lation because enforcement agencies are unable to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the driver in a particular case was inebriated.
32
Thus, any law tending to aid the obtaining of definite evidence as to
the state of intoxication would seem to be a step in the right direction.
It is submitted that the proposed implied consent statute would be
such a law.
This law could accomplish: the elimination of guesswork from the
prosecution of driving while intoxicated cases; the protection of the
temperate drinker, who may be competent to drive, but victimized by
the circumstances of an accident in which he may be involved; the
giving of immediate medical attention to persons who may be injured
and at the time show physical manifestations of alcoholic intoxica-
tion; and, most significantly, the removal of the drunk driver from
Virginia's streets and highways. Where blood tests are used the con-
viction rate is up around go per cent,3 3 and the use of tests in Detroit
during a period of less than ten years has resulted in a decrease in
deaths due to alcohol from ninety to ten a year.34 The 1962 General
Assembly has the opportunity to achieve results just as significant in
Virginia.
ROBERT L. GILUAM, III
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN IN VIRGINIA
The ownership of a home represents stability, security and the
attainment of a coveted economic position, but, in an effort to achieve
this status, the building of a house is often entered into imprudently.
The inexperienced person may find himself put to the expense of
mechanic's lien litigation before he can proceed with what should
have been a reasonably simple and expeditious transaction-paying
the cost of construction. Such litigation involves complexities that
often choke and confuse, rather than enlighten.
3See Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 676, 74 S.E.2d 683 (1953).
3Use Of Chemical Tests For Alcoholic Intoxication-A Symposium, 14 Mid. L.
Rev. 111, 138 (1954).
3'Ibid.
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As early as 1792, Virginia recognized that the mechanic' was a
person deserving special consideration, and provided a tax exemption
2
in order to encourage mechanics to take up residence in the Com-
monwealth. However, it was not until 1843 that Virginia gave the
mechanic a preference as a creditor.3 The purpose of the 1843 Act was
to furnish a form of security for'persons who by their labor, skill and
materials increase the value of property-the property in turn be-
coming pledged by lien for their payment.4
The recent Virginia case of Hadrup v. Sale5 involved the some-
times difficult and often confused issues of priority and attachment.
Hadrup contracted with the owner of a residential subdivision to
perform the plumbing and heating installations for houses to be con-
structed. The property in question, a lot and unfinished house, was
conveyed to Sale and his wife, who duly recorded their deed. The
conveyance and recordation were accomplished subsequent to the
commencement and completion of Hadrup's work, but prior to the
perfection of his lien. Two weeks prior to the completion of the house,
but four months after the conveyance, Hadrup, who had no actual
knowledge of the transfer in ownership, proceeded to perfect his
claim. When Hadrup recorded his lien, the clerk notified him that
there had been a change in ownership and, therefore, Hadrup named
the purchasers in his memorandum to establish his mechanic's lien.
Hadrup then brought suit for the amount due him under the con-
'The word "mechanic" as used refers to those who qualify to avail themselves
of a lien under a mechanic's lien statute, e.g., contractors, subcontractors, material-
men, laborers, furnishers, etc. As statutes vary from state to state, the exact statute
concerned must be consulted. In Virginia see Va. Code Ann. § 43-1 (repl. vol. 1953)
(giving liens to contractors, laborers, mechanics and materialmen).
'Va. Acts 1792, ch. 48, § 4-
'Va. Acts 1843, ch. 76, §§ 1-6.
"Bristol Iron Steel Co. v. Thomas, 93 Va. 396, 25 S.E. 110-12 (1896). The me-
chanic's lien is designed to give security to those adding value to property. Mer-
chants & Mechanics Say. Bank v. Dashiell, Va. 66 (25 Gratt.) 6i6, 621 (1874). The ob-
ject of the law is to give those who have enhanced the value of a building or
structure the security of a lien thereon to the extent that they have added to its
value, but not to give a lien upon property not benefited. Gilman v. Ryan, 95 Va. 494,
28 S.E. 875 (1898). Consequently, it is generally held that no lien arises for tearing
down or wrecking and removing a building or a part thereof. Goldberger-Raabin,
Inc. v. 74 Second Ave. Corp., 252 N.Y. 336, 169 N.E. 405 (1929). However, the same
case held that where improvements for which a lien can properly be obtained are
made, and the work of tearing down old structures or parts thereof is a necessary
part of making the improvements, such work may be included in the lien. 169 N.E. at
406.
"201 Va. 421, 111 S.E.2d 405 (1959)-
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tract with the original owner. The lower court held that Hadrup's
lien should have been filed within sixty days after the property was
conveyed, whether or not the house was finished. The court said:
"When there is a change of ownership, that is notice to contractors
and workmen who do no further work on the house, that the statute
has begun to run and the lien even on an unfinished house must be
filed within the limitations period from the date of sale." 7 Hadrup's
lien was therefore held invalid as the change in ownership had "other-
wise terminated" the work within the meaning of the Virginia statute
and made it necessary for Hadrup to file his claim within sixty days
therefrom.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, stating that "under the
Virginia statute the new owner is chargeable with notice that a lien
might attach to the property for the improvements," and further,
"an inchoate lien attaches to the property when the work is done and
materials furnished which may be perfected within the specified
time... there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the work on
the building is 'otherwise terminated' by a mere sale."8 For these
reasons Hadrup's lien was held valid against the good faith purchasers,
the court feeling that any other construction of the statute would im-
pose an undue hardship upon the mechanic and would not be in
keeping with the language or spirit of the statute.
Although the priority and attachment problems were controlling
in Hadrup, other issues had to be disposed of before the priority9
and attachment questions were reached. In Virginia mechanic's lien
litigation is brought on the equity side of the court, 0 However, this
"The work was done and the lien was filed by Hadrup. However, Hadrup
assigned in writing to third parties all sums of money due him under his contract
with the original owner. The assignment had no bearing on the outcome of the case.
For the aqsignability of mechanic's lien claims, see Va. Code Ann. § 43-19 (repl. vol.
1953). For cases construed under this section see Anderson v. White, 183 Va. 302, 32
S.E.2d 72 (1944) (subcontractor's lien is assignable); Coleman v. Peraman, 159 Va. 72,
165 S.E. 371 (1932) (assignment is valid against subcontractors who have no poten-
tial liens); Dewitt v. Coffey, i5o Va. 365, 143 S.E. 710 (1928) (priority of inchoate but
potcntial liens is preserved); Electric Transmission Co. of Va. v. Pennington Gap
Bank, Inc., 137 Va. 9., 119 S.E. 99 (1923) (contract of suretyship with option to
complete).
7111 S.E.2d at 4o6.
11d. at 407.
OProblems arising where there are more than one lien claimant were not en-
countered in the Hadrup case. For excellent discussions of this subject see Comment,
41 Yale L.J. 271 (1931), and Note, 29 Va. L. Rev. 121 (1942).
"Virginia's view is in accord with the principle that enforcement depends upon
the essential nature of the substantive right which the statute creates. Since a lien
is created, it must be foreclosed by the same equitable process that is used for
i96o]
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does not mean that the lien claimant is relieved of bringing himself
within the statute.1 While there is a tendency to liberalize the rules
relating to the attachment of the lien,12 Virginia's policy is to strictly
construe them.' 3 But once the Virginia courts find that the lien has
attached, construction is liberal so that the purpose of the Act may be
attained.14 The rule of strict compliance with the letter of the law
makes it essential that contractors, subcontractors, materialmen and
laborers use extreme care in the initial steps taken to procure their
liens, for any departure from the necessary requirements is fatal.,
Hadrup was qualified to avail himself of the mechanic's lien
statute,16 for he was not claiming a greater amount than that due him
under his contract,17 and his work resulted in a substantial improve-
mortgages. As that process does not include a jury trial as a matter of right, it
follows that a jury cannot be demanded in the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.
Behrens v. Kruse, 121 Minn. 28, 14o N.W. 118 (913); DiMenna v. Cooper Co.,
22o N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917)-
In a minority of jurisdictions the lien is considered a statutory method of en-
forcing a debt, with the result that issues of fact are tried by a jury. Nolte v. Nan-
nino, io7 N.J.L. 462, 154 At. 831 (1931).
"Monk v. Exposition Deepwater Pier Co., iii Va. 121, 68 S.E. 280 (191o). See
also Mann v. Clowser, 19o Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950); Rison v. Moon, 91 Va.
384, 22 S.E. 165 (1895); Bailey Constr. Co. v. Purcell, 88 Va. 3oo, 13 S.E. 456 (1891).
"Caidwell v. Schmulbach, 175 Fed. 429,438 (C.C.N.D. W. Va. 1909); United States
Blowpipe v. Spencer, 40 W. Va. 698, 21 S.E. 769 (1895).
"Clement v. Adam-Bros. Paynes Co., 13 Va. 547, 73 S.E. 294 (1912).
"4"An examination of outside authorities shows that there is a hopeless diver-
sity of opinion as to whether mechanic's liens statutes should receive a liberal or
strict construction. We believe the correct rule deducible from the language and
purposes of our statute, and the decisions of this court with respect to it, is that
there must be a substantial compliance with the requirement of that portion of the
statute which relates to the creation of the lien, but that the provisions with respect
to its enforcement should be liberally construed." Francis v. Hotel Rueger, 125
Va. io6, 99 S.E. 69o, 694 (1919). See also Mathews v. Myers, 151 Va. 426, 145 S.E. 352,
353 (1928) (lien for adherence of wages wherein the rule of Francis case was applied).
"Trustees v. Davis, 85 Va. 193, 7 S.E. 245 (1888).
"The Virginia mechanic's lien statute gives the lien only to general contractors
and subcontractors and persons contracting with them. Va. Code Ann. § 43-1 (repl.
vol. 1953). The courts have defined a subcontractor as one who furnishes material
to a contractor under a continuing contract, Staples v. Adams, Payne & Gleaves, Inc.,
215 Fed. 322 (4th Cir. 1914), and as one to whom the principal contractor sublets a
portion or all of the contract itself, S. V. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 8o Va. 821, 7- S.E. 246
(1885). See also London Bros. v. National Exch. Bank, 121 Va. 460, 93 S.E. 699
(1917)-
It is interesting to note that Hadrup was considered as a general contractor rath-
er than a subcontractor. Hadrup contracted directly with the owner. The sub-
sequent conveyance from the contracting owner to the defendant Sales had no effect
upon Hadrup's status. Va. Code Ann. § 43-1 (repl. vol. 1953).
,-A mechanic's lien can bind no greater interest in the property than the lien
claimant has in the contract. Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Main Line Reality Corp.,
112 Va. 7, 70 S.E. 536 (191 .
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ment.'5 Also, the property involved was capable of being subjected
to Hadrup's claim. Therefore, since Hadrup had strictly complied
with the statutory requirements for perfecting his claim,19 the question
confronting the Supreme Court of Appeals was whether a conveyance
by the owner to a good faith purchaser of the lot and unfinished house
"otherwise terminated" the work upon the house and made it necessary
for the lien claimant to file his claim within sixty days from the date
of conveyance. The answer depends on the language of the Virginia
Code, which provides in part:
"A general contractor in order to perfect the lien given by the
preceding section shall file at any time after the work is done
and the materials furnished by him and before the expiration
of sixty days from the time such building, structure, or railroad
is completed, or the work thereon otherwise terminated.'20
The general rule in all jurisdictions is that a mechanic's lien has
priority if it has attached to the property before the conveyance is
made.21 The conflict lies in the Hadrup situation, where a conveyance
is made subsequent to the contract and completion of the improve-
ments, but before the lien has been perfected. Four theories are fol-
lowed. Some jurisdictions hold that there is no lien until notice is
filed, and priorities are determined by date of filing.22 In other juris-
dictions the lien attaches to all conveyances made subsequent to the
delivery of materials and labor to the job.23 Still other jurisdictions
follow the rule that a properly perfected lien relates back to the date
of the contract between the owner and the contractor.24 In a few
jurisdictions, a properly perfected lien relates back to the commence-
'Va. Code Ann. §§ 43-4 (repl. vol. 1953).
'See Va. Code Ann. §§ 43-4, 43-5, 43-17, 43-19 (repl. vol. 1953).
'Wa. Code Ann § 43-4 (repl. vol. 1953). (Emphasis added).
2 1Waterbury Lumber & Coal Co. v. Asterchinsky, 87 Conn. 316, 87 Ad. 739 (1913).
'Dwight v. Acme Lumber & Supply Co., 186 Ga. 8o 5 , 199 S.E. 178 (1938); Paris v.
Lawyers' Title Ins. SL Trust Co., 141 App. Div. 866, 126 N.Y. Supp. 753 (1910);
Hinckley & Egery Iron Co. v. James, 51 Vt. 240, (1878). Here general registry may
be had at any time after beginning to perform labor or furnish materials.
'Corwell v. Gilmore, 18 Cal. 370 (1861); Class v. Freeberg, 5o Minn. 386, 52
N.W. 9oo (1892); H. F. Cady Lumber Co. v. Miles, 96 Neb. 10 7 , 147 N.W. 210 (1914);
Thorn v. Barringer, 73 W. Va. 618, 81 S.E. 846 (1914). This rule is based on the
theory that mechanic's liens are an extraordinary remedy given to protect one who
performs labor or furnishes materials in a specific res, and until he begins to perform
the labor or furnish the material he has no claim.
-"Paddock v. Stout, 121 Ill. 571, 13 N.E. 182 (1887); Shaughnessy v. Isenberg,
213 Mass. 159, 99 N.E. 975 (1912). It has been suggested that the absence of a re-
quirement that the contract be recorded is prejudicial to the rights of innocent
parties who have no knowledge of the owner's intention to build on his property.
Comment, 36 Yale L.J. 131 (1926).
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ment of work, so that subsequent conveyances are made subject to
the possibility of the lien becoming effective upon recordation. 25 Under
the Virginia statute it appears the last theory prevails, i.e., the lien re-
lates back to the time of the commencement of work.2 In Hadrup the
court followed that theory and further held that, if there was a transfer
in ownership after commencement and completion of the work, the lien
claimant may validly assert his claim against the new owner, as the
new owner is charged with notice that liens might attach to the prop-
erty for the improvements. In so holding, the court seems to be apply-
ing the dictum from the 1941 Virginia case of Wallace v. Brumback.2 7
In that case the original owner of vacant land entered into a contract
with a contractor to erect a building. While the building was in the
course of construction there were two transfers of the property-the
final transferee having contractually agreed to pay off all liens, per-
fected or inchoate. The contractor, however, upon completing his
work named the original owner, with whom he made the contract,
in his memorandum to effect his mechanic's lien. The court held the
lien invalid in regards to the original owner, concluding that the word
"owner" means the holder of the legal title at the time the lien is
filed, not the owner at the time the contract was made. At the same
time, in indicating that if the lien had been filed in proper form it
would have prevailed against the new owner who purchased after the
work had begun, the court said: "One who purchases a building pend-
ing construction takes it subject to the risk that a mechanic's lien may
thereafter be perfected thereon."
28
It seems that the Virginia court has reached a fair result in Hadrup.
The rule it propounds is that an inchoate lien attaches and the statute
starts running when the improvements are actually completed. A con-
veyance of the property during the course of the work is not control-
ling, but of course the lien must be perfected within the statutory
period 29 from the date of completion or the mechanic will lose his
'IWelch v. Porter & Co., 63 Ala. 225 (1879). Accord, H. C. Behrens Lumber Co.
v. Lager, 26 S.D. 16o, 128 NA.. 698 (191o); Peatman v. Centerville Light, Heat &
Power Co., 1o5 Iowa 1, 74 N.W. 689 (1898); Nixon v. Knights of Pythias, 56, Kan.
298, 43 Pac. 236 (1896); Murray v. Swanson, 18 Mont. 533, 46 Pac. 441 (1896).
'Va. Code Ann §§ 43-1-3 , 7-8, 20-23 (repl. vol. 1953).
177 Va. 36, 12 S.E. 8oi. This case is in accord with Continental Supply Co.
v. White, 92 Monst. 254, 12 P.2d 569 (1932).
212 S.E.2cd at 802.
-'The statutory period differs in the various jurisdictions; Virginia allows
sixty days. Va. Code Ann. § 43-4 (repl. vol. 1953). However, liens perfected by de-
crees in mechanic's lien proceedngs remain in full force without revival proceed-
ings for a period of ten years as provided by statutes governing judgments in rem,
unless fully discharged, and do not expire after a period of three years as do liens
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right to the lien. In addition to subjecting the purchaser to a possible
second liability for the cost of the lien claimant's work,3 0 Hadrup
will further inconvenience the purchaser by requiring him to call the
original contracting owner into court to indemnify him if he is re-
quired to make the second payment. Hence it must be admitted that
the rule of Hadrup is an obstacle in the good faith purchaser's path.
It is not an insurmountable obstacle though, for the purchaser may
protect himself either by contract, or by withholding part of the pur-
chase price for the period of limitation.31 Consequently, the result is
not nearly as harsh as it appears at first impression, especially when the
purpose of the Act and the requirement that the lien claimant strict-
ly comply with the statutory procedure 32 are taken into consideration.
When the conveyance is made subsequent to both the contract and
the completion of work, the question of attachment is adequately dis-
posed of by Hadrup. When the conveyance is made subsequent to
the contract but "prior to the commencement of work," Virginia
should allow the inchoate mechanic's lien to attach at the date of con-
tract. In this case the lien resembles a mortgage for future advances, 33
and the date of attachment should not be postponed until comple-
tion of the contract for then it would be of little use. It should be
treated as inchoate when the contract is made, to ripen or fade with
performance. 34 In subscribing to the rule that the lien relates back to
the time of the commencement of work, the problem of determining
what act constitutes commencement of work is often difficult to de-
cide.35 On the other hand, at least one noted writer prefers the rule
under judgments in penonam. Rosenzweig v. Ferguson, 348 Mo. 1144, 158 S.V.2d 124
(1940-
'This statement is made upon the premise that the Sales had already paid the
owner for the lot and improvements.
'For an informative discussion of defenses to mechanic's lien actions, see An-
derson, Defenses to Actions under Mechanics Lien 'Statute, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 460
(1942).
"' See notes 16, 17, 18, and 19 supra.
•'2 Glenn, Mortgages § 35 (1943).
31Irrespective of statute, a mechanic's lien, though obtained through self-help
and inchoate prior to perfection, has always been considered a true lien as dis-
tinguished from a mere right to priority of payment for debt. Glenn, Fraudulent
Conveyances and Preferences § 447 (rev. ed. 1940).
3'What constitutes a sufficient commencement of a building or any improvements
is a point of much conjecture and difficulty. Merely piling lumber without any
act of building is enough in some states, James v. Van Horn, 39 N.J.L. 353, 363
(1877), but is not in others, Kansas Mortg. Co. v. Weyerhaeuser, 48 Kan. 335, 29
Pac. 153 (1892). One state has gone so far as to hold that a contract with an archi-
tect is the inception of the building within the meaning of the statute. Wight,
Mechanic's Liens on Non-Homestead Property from the Standpoint of the Loan
Company, 2 Texas L. Rev. 77 (1923).
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that there shall be no lien until notice is filed with priorities de-
termined by date of filing." 6 While Hadrup retains this rule in part
by requiring that notice be filed and recorded in strict compliance
with the statute, it deviates by allowing the inchoate lien to attach
when the work is finished and materials furnished.3 7 Consequently, in
the situation where a conveyance is made subsequent to the contract
but prior to commencement of work, the question of the validity of
the lien would be in a state of flux. The rule of Hadrup, on its face,
does not secure to the mechanic his statutory remedy in this situation.
It is submitted that, in the Hadrup factual situation, any rule other
than Hadrup or the "relation back to contract" rule would require
the lien claimant to proceed with extreme care in seeking his statu-
tory remedy. It would further require him to maintain a constant vigil
at the contracting owner's doorstep so that he might ascertain any
alienation of the property prior to the completion of the improvements
and the perfection of his lien. Doubtless the "priority of time record-
ing" rule is meritorious in many instances, but it would not help the
lien claimant in the Hadrup situation. The Virginia court has, there-
fore, handed down a desirable rule, if only in that the result is the
lesser of two evils.
38
PAUL H. COFFEY, JR.
362 Glenn, Mortgages § 351 (1943).
'"See note 7 supra. Some states hold that where an owner of real estate con-
tracts to sell it to another and build a house on it for a single price, he continues as
owner until the deed is given, so that he may charge the property with mechanic's
liens without necessity of notice to the intending purchaser. Hannan v. Handy,
104 Conn. 653, 134 At. 71 (s6). Accord, Houston v. Long, t5 Ky. L. Rep. 721, 23
S.W. 586 (1893); Panhandle Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co.,
62 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 132 S.V. 963 (Civ. App. igo); Evans-Lee Co. v.Knudtson,
190 Wis. 207, 2o8 N.W. 872 (1926). However, it is impossible to ascertain from the
stated facts in Hardup whether or not the deed given was for the land and im-
provements or land only. From the language used it is implied tht the deed was
for the land only. "[L]ot 67 had been purchased... by appellees .... Appellees deed
was duly recorded...." i11 S.E.2d at 405.
""If a sale of it [the property] by the owner operates to defeat the laborer's
lien, then to file notice of it would be nugatory,-a mockery. It is said that such
liens, until notice of them is filed, are snares to innocent buyers of the property to
which they attach. This may be so in a measure, but the legislature had power
to provide for and allow them as it has done. It, and not the court, must be the
judge of the expediency and wisdom of such legislation." Burr v. Kerchner, 99 N.C.
263, 6 S.E. so8, 11o (1888).
